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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amid are law professors who regularly conduct scholarly

research in, publish on, and teach the subjects of evidence or
professional responsibility in law schools throughout the Nation.
Amici law professors have written extensively on issues relating to
the attorney-client privilege, and several have written or edited

leading texthooks and treatises on the law of evidence or
In addition, many amici have had
practical experience on both sides of civil and criminal cases;
professional responsibility.

experience working as attorneys in government offices or agencies;
and experience teaching evidence to the bench and bar.

Amid have a professional interest in and concern for the
effective workings of the courts, government, and the legal
profession. In particular, am! ci have an interest in the integrity and
soundness of rules of evidence and privilege as they may affect the
processes by which public policy, law, and regulations are made.
As teachers of law, amid are also students of the legal profession
and the contribution it makes to our system of government. These

interests are heightened when the subject is, as in this case, the

application of the attorney-client privilege in the context of
government agencies and attorneys.

Brief biographical statements of individual amid are included
in an Appendix to this brief. All parties have consented to the filing
of this brief.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRiT
This Court should grant review not only because this is a case

of national importance and prominence, but also because the
decision below is a conspicuous departure from settled principles of
evidence law. The panel majority concluded that communications

between government lawyers and government officials are not
protected by the attorney-client privilege, at least when those
communications are sought by a federal grand jury. That
conclusion conflicts with the predominant common-law understanding that the attorney-client privilege applies to government entities
and that where the privilege applies, it is absolute (i.e., it protects

against disclosure in all types of legal and investigative
(1)

2
proceedings). In particular, the Court of Appeals' decision rests on
a fundamental misunderstanding of this Court's decisions in Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.s. 683 (1974).

Moreover, this case warrants further review because the
decision below has profound implications beyond the parties to this

dispute. The Court of Appeals' ruling, if allowed to stand, will
create widespread uncertainty among federal, state, and local
officials concerning the extent to which their communications with
their agency lawyers, for the purpose of seeking legal advice in the
conduct of governmental affairs, are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Unless this Court grants review and resolves this
uncertainty, the decision below wifi likely have an adverse effect on

the current and future operation of not only the Office of the
President of the United States, but also government at all levels. At
the very least, a decision of such vast implications (as in the present
case) should be made by the highest court in the land. We accordingly urge the Court to grant the petition for review.'

I. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES AN EXCEPTION TO
THE AflORNEY-CLIENT PRiVILEGE THAT IS NOT
IN ACCORD WITH ACCEPTED LEGAL PRINCIPLES
AND HAS IMPORTANT ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
FOR GOVERNMENT

A. It Is Well-Settled That The Attorney-Client Privilege
Applies To Government Entities

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, with

limited exceptions, that the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed

Because this brief urges the Court merely to grant further review,

amid do not address in this brief the question whether, assuming the
attorney-client privilege applies to government entities and is absolute, the
requirements for asserting the privilege have been satisfied in this case.
Those questions are more appropriately addressed if and when this Court.

elects to grant certiorari. Amid also do not address in this brief the
attorney work-product issue raised by petitioner.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, this certifies that this
brief was prepared in its entirety by amid curiae and their
counsel. Counsel for the parties did not author this brief in
whole or in part. No person or entity other than amid curiae or
their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief.

3

by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by

the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." As the coUrt below recognized (Pet. App. 5a), the
starting point of analysis is therefore the common law, "interpreted
in the light of reason and experience." Fed. it. Evid. 501.
At common law, it has long been understood that the attorney-

client privilege applies to communications between government
entities and government lawyers for the purpose of seeking and
providing legal advice. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A.
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence Manàal ¶ 1 8.03 [02] [a] , at 18-18
(1996) ("Artificial entities, public or private, are . . . considered
clients for purposes of the attorney-client privilege."); Paul R. Rice,
Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 4:28, at 498 (1993)

("When government agencies consult with legal counsel for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance . . . the attorneyclient privilege protects [their] communications to those attorneys.");

1 Scott N. Stone & Robert K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges
§ 1.18, at 1-47 (2d ed. 1995) ("Courts agree that the client may be
. organization or entity, either public or private.") (footnotes

an. .

omitted); Richard 0. Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modem
Approach to Evidence 693 (2d ed. 1982) (The proposed federal
rule and most of the rules that have been enacted by states which
used it as a guideline assume that a client can be a government
agency as well as a corporation. ")•2

In SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 92 F.R.D. 65, 67
(NJ). Ga. 1981), for example, the court applied the principles of this
Court's Upjohn decision to communications between SEC staff and SEC
counsel. And in Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 697, 699
(1990), the court concluded that the "same reasoning" that this Court
employed in Upjohn applies to "Government employees at all levels." In
addition to the cases cited by petitioner in its Petition for Certiorari

("Pet.'), see Pet. 18 n.5, other cases that recognize a governmental
attorney-client privilege include Connecticut Mist. Life Ins. 0,. v. Shields,
18 F.R.D. 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (communications between bridge
commission and its attorneys held to be privileged), State v. Today's Book-

store, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1283, 1288 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ('The city is
like a corporation, and the same attorney-client privilege enjoyed by

4
Although the issue has typically arisen in the context of civil
litigation, we are aware of no reported decision (prior to this one)

that suggests a different rule applies in criminal or grand jury
proceedings. Any such distinction would be a departure from a
fundamental feature of the attorney-client privilege; namely, that the

privilege protects against compelled disclosure regardless of the
forum in which the privileged communication is sought. See infra
pp. 6-9. Indeed, the few decisions that have confronted the issue in
a criminal setting have recognized the existence of the privilege.
See In re Grand Juiy Subpoena, 886 F.2d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir.
1989) (vacating district court's order to enforce a federal grand jury

subpoena and remanding to determine whether minutes of a city
council meeting were confidential); In re Grand Juiy Subpoenas
Duces Tecum Served by the Sussex County Grand Jury, 574 A.2d
449, 454-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (attorney employed
by a county board of freeholders cannot be required to reveal client
communications to a grand jury investigating the county).3

Apart from judicial decisions, the Freedom of Information Act

("FOLk") expressly recognizes that an attorney-client privilege
exists between government agencies and their lawyers. See 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1994); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 154 (1975); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep 't of

Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 19Th. Although the

panel majority below dismissed FOIA jurisprudence as "sui

corporations is enjoyed by the city?), and Rowley v. Ferguson. 48 N.E.2d
243, 248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) (communications between attorney and
client, both of whom were public officials, held to be privileged).

It should not be surprising that there are few reported judicial
decisions in the criminal or grand jury context, because the decision
whether to waive attorney-client privilege in the context of a criminal or
grand jury proceeding is often made within the Executive Branch. See Pet.
20 n.6. In addition, amid surmise that one reason this issue is not litigated
more frequently is that, in the past, lawyers. judges, and scholars had no
hat government
reason not to assume — or reasonably took for granted t—

agencies, no less than other entities, could assert the attorney-client
privilege in the face of a criminal or grand jury investigation.

5

generis," Pet. App. IDa, it would have been singularly odd for
Congress, which is presumed to be well-versed in this area of the
law, to recognize an attârney-client privilege in the POIA context
if the general rule were that no such privilege exists.
Furthermore, Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 provides

that any "organization or entity, either public or private, who is
rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from
him," is entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235

(1972). The Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 503
confirm that "[t]he definition of 'client' includes governmental
bodies." Id. at 237 (citations omitted). Although the panel
majority's analysis began with Proposed Rule 503, it abandoned
further consideration on the curious ground that the Proposed Rule
announces a "broad proposition" without specifically addressing "the
particular situation before us in this case." Pet. App. 6a-7a. Courts
usually do not disregard plain language in a statute or rule on the
basis that the text speaks in general terms.
More importantly, Proposed Rule 503 has been recognized as

"a powerful and complete summary of black-letter principles of
lawyer-client privilege. Perhaps more than any other privilege
proposal that was contained in the draft rules presented to Congress,
Standard 503 represents a convenient and logical summary of core

principles in privilege doctrine." 3 Weinstein's Federal Evidence
§ 503.02,

at 503-8 (McLaughlin ed., 2d at. 1997). Because

Proposed Rule 503 "is useful as a restatement of the traditional

'Although Rule 503 is a proposed nile, and therefore not binding on

the courts, its pedigree makes it a persuasive authority. See, e.g.,
Weinstein's Evidence Manual ¶ l8.03[Ol], at 18-17 ("Standard 503
remains a useful starting point in examining the use of the attorney-client
privilege in the federal courts today. It is an accurate restatement of actual
practice and is cited to frequently") (footnote omitted); In re Diner Co.,
16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th dr. 1994) (Proposed Rule 503 is "a useful starting

place" for examination of the federal common law of attorney-client
privilege).

6
common law lawyer-client privilege that had been applied in the
federal courts prior to the adoption of the federal rules," Weinstein's
Federal Evidence, supra, § 503.02, at 503-8 (footnote omitted), the
court below should have viewed Proposed Rule 503 as persuasive

(though not dispositive) authority that federal common law,
interpreted "in the light of reason and experience," Fed. R. Evid.
501, includes a governmental attorney-client privilege.5

B. The Purposes Served By The Attorney-Client Privilege
Apply With Full Force To Communications Between
Government Entities And Government Lawyers
The attorney-client privilege is a long-recognized exception to

the general rule that the public has a right "to every man's
evidence," United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Indeed, it "is the oldest of

the privileges for confidential communications known to the

common law." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (citing 8 John H.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). The purpose
of the privilege is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the

observance of the law and administration of justice. The
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves

Other authorities also recognize a government attorney-client
privilege. See. e.g.. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("The attorney-client privilege
extends to a communication of a governmental organization."); Uniform
Rule of Evidence 502 (defining "client" to include governmental bodies and
public officers; subsection (d)(6), which restricts the scope of the privilege.

has been rejected by most States, see infra note 10); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6 comment ("The requirement of maintaining
confidentiality of information relating to representation applies to
government lawyers .. ."); cf Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and
Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82
(leo. L.J. 1781, 1841 (1994) (proposing a new Federal Rule of Evidence
501 that includes a governmental attorney-client privilege).

7
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer's being fully informed by the client.

Id. The attorney-client privilege "'rests on the need for the
advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's
reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to
be carried out.'" Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.

40, 51(1980)). Its purpose is "to encourage clients to make MI
disclosure to their attorneys." Id. at 389 (quoting Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).

In Upjohn, the Court rejected a narrow application of the
attorney-client privilege to corporations, concluding that the narrow
"control group" test "overlook[ed] the fact that the privilege exists
to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who

can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to
enable him to give sound and informed advice." 449 U.S. at 390
(citations omitted). The Upjohn Court recognized that "[t]he first
step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual
background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the legally
'It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his
relevant. .

independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and
important from the irrelevant and unimportant.'" Id. at 390-91

(quoting ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical
Consideration 4-1).

This Court in Upjohn also recognized that "if the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client

must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege...
is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
Upjohn thus affirmed the central principle that the attorney-client
privilege, where it exists, is absolute and cannot be overcome by a

showing of need. See, e.g., Rice, supra, § 2.2, at 2-50 ("If the
protection were not absolute, it would not be predictable, and the

client could not rely on it. Absent a waiver of the protection,
therefore, the privilege precludes disclosure of the communications

8
regardless of the need that might be demonstrated for the information in them") (footnotes omitted).6

The purposes served by the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate setting apply with equal force in the government setting.
See Rice, supra, § 4:45, at 4-175 (government agencies "need legal
advice and assistance, and the privilege's rationale of encouraging
more open communications from the client to the attorney is no less

applicable, even though these entities can only speak and act
through the individuals who represent them"). Government
lawyers, no less than lawyers serving private clients, need to know

all relevant ftcts before providing legal advice. The need to
promote full and frank disclosure between clients and their lawyers

is no less pressing in the government context than in the private
context.'

6

The focus on encouraging the communication a ante means that the
privilege derives its justification independently of the context in which the

information is sought a post. In other words, given the rationales
supporting the attorney-client privilege, there is no principled basis on
which to distinguish between privileged information sought later in a
criminal investigation or in civil litigation. Moreover, because the focus
is on encouraging communication a ante, the essence of the privilege goes

to the need for candor and full access to information at the time the
communication is made, not to the need for the information after the
communication is made. In creating an exception to the attorney-client
privilege for communications sought by a federal grand juty, the court
below appears to have ignored this bedrock principle of privilege law.
'The United States government employs more than 22,000 lawyers
to handle its legal problems (two to three percent of all U.S. lawyers).
The variety of legal work performed by government lawyers is nearly as

broad as the breadth of legal activity generally. Lawyers for the federal
government are advisors, counselors and litigators; and they deal virtually
Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as
in every legal specialty
Whistleblower: Confidentiality and Government Lawyers, 5 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 291, 292 (1991). 'Recognition of the attorney-client privilege for
governmental entities is said to encourage more open communication
between governmental officials and their lawyers, thereby enhancing the
quality of governmental decisionmaking. Denial of the privilege would put

9
This Court in Upjohn recognized that a corporation's lawyers
cannot function effectively for a corporation without the information
provided by employees of the corporation, and that In the absence
of privilege such information might be withheld from the lawyers to

the detriment of the corporation, the legal system, and the public
generally. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-95. The same is true of
lawyers for government agencies. Legal advice is just as essential

to a government agency's proper functioning as it is to a
corporation's. Legal advice can be key to the agency's
understanding of and obedience to the law, and key to the agency's

formulation of sound public policy and sound legal regulations.
Legal advice for a government agency is particularly necessary in

the modern world's increasingly complex and sometimes
counterintuitive laws governing agencies and their officials. As this
Court observed in Upjohn, "[i]n light of the vast and complicated
array of regulatory legislation," efforts to comply with the law will
require "'constantly go[ing] to lawyers to find out how to obey the

law,' particularly since compliance with the law in this area is
hardly an instinctive matter." 449 U.S. at 392 (citations omitted).
There can be little dispute that this observation applies with at least
equal force to government agencies. At bottom, just as this Court
recognized in the context of corporate attorney-client

communications in Upjohn, application of the attorney-client
privilege in a governmental context promotes, rather than impedes,
the fair and accurate administration of justice.

C. The "Grand Jury Exception" Created Below To The
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege Erodes The
Benefits Of The Privilege So Severely That Only The
Nation's Highest Court Should Make That Decision
The panel majority below rejected the proposition that "an
entity of the federal government may use the attorney-client
privilege to avoid complying with a subpoena [issued] by a federal

grand jury." Pet. App. 5a. But just as limiting the privilege to

public entities at an unfair disadvantage in both criminal prosecutions and

civil litigation." 2 Christopher B. Mueller & lArd C. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence Second § 191, at 352 (1994).

10

members of a corporation's "control group" would "frustratefl the
very purpose of the privilege," Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392, so too
would the decision of the court below to remove communications

from the governmental attorney-client privilege when they are
sought in a grand jury proceeding deny the essence of the privilege
for the governmental entity.

The panel majority assumed that "confidentiality will suffer

only in those situations that a grand jury may later see fit to
investigate." Pet. App. 19a.8 But grand jury investigations of
governmental decisionmaking and decisionmakers are (unfortunately) no longer uncommon, and there can thus be considerable uncer-

tainty whether a future grand jury may someday be interested in
otherwise privileged communications. As this Court recognized in
Upjohn, 'if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected."

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct.
1923, 1932 (1996) ("We reject the balancing component of the
privilege. . . . Making the promise of confidentiality contingent
upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the

evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the
effectiveness of the privilege."); qt. Paul F. Rothstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony in the Light

of Its Purpose, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1189, 1194 (1963)
(contrasting communications privileges, which require certainty of
applicability, with other privileges, which do not). Given the broad

The court below also asserted that it did not

foresee any likely effect of our decision on the ability of a
government lawyer to advise an official who is contemplating a

future course of conduct. If the attorney explains the law
accurately and the official follows that advice, no harm can
come from later disclosure of the advice. . . . [WJe cannot
conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of
their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because
of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the
context of a criminal prosecution.
Pet. App. 19a-20a (citation omitted).

11

investigative mandate of federal grand juries, the uncertainty as to

whether otherwise protected communications may lose that
protection will frustrate the very purpose of the privilege.
Indeed, denial of the attorney-client privilege in the grand jury

context would be an unprecedented exception to the privilege.
There is no "grand jury exception" to the attorney-client privilege
for individuals or corporations. A grand jury exception to the
attorney-client privilege in the government context would cut a
gaping hole in the privilege and would have a significant chilling
effect on communications. Federal grand juries can investigate a
wide range of conduct or suspected conduct and are not limited by

relevancy rules applicable at trial. See, e.g., United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974). Thus, a government
employee speaking with agency counsel about matters necessary to
the daily effective functioning of the agency would not necessarily
know if the matter could possibly be of interest one day to a federal

grand jury. The fear that it might, however, would undoubtedly
chill communications with agency attorneys. In addition, if the
attorney-client privilege did not apply to government agencies in the

context of federal grand jury investigations, every agency lawyer

could become a potential prosecution witness against agency
officials who have sought legal advice from that lawyer or against
government employees who have provided information necessary for
that lawyer to offer such advice.
As a result of both these implications, government officials and

employees would likely be deterred from seeking legal advice
regarding the legality of theft conduct, which would have several
undesirable effects. First, it might encourage agency officials and
employees to remain deliberately ignorant of the law. Second, it
might deter some officials or employees from engaging in proper
and desirable conduct for fear that it might be illegal. Also, it
might cause government agencies to establish policies they might not

establish had officials obtained confidential legal advice, or to

engage in conduct they might have eschewed had officials consulted
government counsel about theft proposed course of conduct. Those
government officials who do actually seek legal advice might decide
to withhold crucial information or otherwise refrain from free and
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frank exploratory discussions, thus undermining the quality and
effectiveness of any legal advice that is ultimately given.

This uncertainty over the prospect of a future grand jury
investigation that would require disclosure of otherwise privileged
communications is compounded by other uncertainties raised by the
decision below. For example, unless this Court grants review and
announces a uniform nile, there will be uncertainty over whether
other courts will follow the court below and, if so, whether a future
grand jury will seek such communications in those jurisdictions.
There will be uncertainty over whether the rule announced by the
court below might also apply to other types of proceedings, such as
criminal trials or civil proceedings. The decision below also raises

substantial uncertainty as to whether the same exception would
apply to state or local government agencies and officials and if so,
whether a future grand jury will seek such communications in a
jurisdiction that applies the "grand jury exception" created below to

state and local government agencies and officials. Cf Paul F.
Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 Geo. L.J. 125, 130-35 (1973) (urging general confor-

mity of privileges with state law to avoid uncertainty). These
uncertainties, each of which tends to undermine the very existence

of the privilege, see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393, present an
independent, compelling basis on which this Court should grant
review.

D. A "Grand Jury Exception" To The Governmental
Attorney-Client Privilege Pays Far Fewer Dividends to

Grand Jury Investigations Than The Court Below
Assumed

The decision below sought to distinguish application of the
privilege in a civil setting from application of the privilege in a
criminal setting by advancing •1the general principle that the
government's need for confidentiality may be subordinated to the
needs of the government's own criminal justice processes." Pet.
App. isa (discussing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
The panel majority also cited Nixon to support its conclusion that
"[ejven if. . . the governmental attorney-client privilege ordinarily
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applies in civil litigation," a different rule is warranted in criminal
proceedings. Pet. App. 1 la.

At the outset, the panel majority's conclusion rests on a
fundamental misreading of Nixon. This Court's opinion in Nixon
expressly distinguished the qualified privilege at issue in that case
from absolute privileges, such as those that apply to military or
diplomatic secrets. 418 U.s. at 706-07. Nixon did not suggest that
the attorney-client privilege, which has long been regarded as an

absolute privilege, is subject to a balancing analysis. To the
contrary, the Court expressly acknowledged the existence of
"common-law . . . privileges," including the privilege of "an
attorney" who "may not be required to disclose what has been
418 U.S. at 709.
revealed in professional confidence."
Furthermore, there was a much stronger showing of need for the

evidence in Nixon. In Nixon, the information at issue was not
available from any other source, because the relevant individuals

couldnotbecalledaswitnessesinaCrilflinaltrial. Inthiscase,by
contrast, the Independent Counsel has other sources for the
information he seeks. Because Mrs. Clinton has already testified
before the grand jury, for example, the Independent Counsel's need
for counsel's debriefmg notes related to that testimony is far less
pressing than the Special Prosecutor's need for the tapes in Nixon.

More importantly, even apart from the panel majority's
misreading of Nixon, the decision below overestimates the potential
benefits to law enforcement from denial of a governmental attorney-

client privilege in the context of grand jury proceedings. First, it
is well-established that '[tihe privilege only protects disclosure of
communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying
facts by those who communicated with the attorney." Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 395 (emphasis added). As such, recognition of the privilege

in the context of a grand jury subpoena does not and would not
prevent the Independent Counsel (or some future party seeking
grand jury evidence) from obtaining the underlying information
from sources other than attorney-client communications. See id. at

396 ("While it would probably be more convenient for the
Government to secure the results of petitioner's internal
investigation by simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes
taken by petitioner's attorneys, such considerations of convenience
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do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client
privilege."). In this case, for example, because Mrs. Clinton has
already testified before a grand July, the Independent Counsel

presumably has had ample opportunity to question her about
underlying facts relevant to his investigation. What the attorneyclient privilege protects — in this as in any other context — are
confidential communications where there is an overarching public
benefit in "encourag[ing] full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients [to] promote broader public interests in
the observance of the law and administration of justice." Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 389.
Second, as this Court and others have recognized, the privilege
does not serve to suppress evidence; rather, the privilege serves to

encourage communications from the client to the attorney that
otherwise might not have been uttered. C7 Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at
1929 ("Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which
. seek access. . . is unlikely to come into being. This

litigants. .

unspoken 'evidence' will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking
function than if it had been spoken and privileged").9 Thus, even
apart from the significant adverse effect on governmental operations

that is likely to occur, denial of the governmental attorney-client
privilege for grand Jury investigations provides no commensurate
benefits for the administration of justice.

The privilege "keeps from the court only sources of information that

would not exist without the privilege." Rice, supm, § 2:3, at 56-57
(quoting Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications. 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 1501, 1508 (1985)). As such, "when the attorney-client privilege
is properly understood, it reaches communications that are presumed to

have been made precisely because the privilege exists. .

.

. It is not

accurate, therefore, to say that the privilege operates in derogation of the

truth. .. . [lit is important, in understanding the privilege, to focus on the
time period before the communications are made." Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar
Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 }iofstra L. Rev. 817, 823-24 (1984); see also

Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and
Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L. Rev. 597, 600 n.9 (1980) (courts should recognize
the information-generating effect of a privilege).
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION RAISES A
SERIOUS ISSUE OF FEDERALISM
The panel majority's decision also raises significant federalism

concerns. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that state law
governing attorney-client privilege does not apply in the federal
courts, except in civil actions and proceedings "with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule

of decision. Fed. R. Evid. 501. Accordingly, if state law
provides that communications between state government officials
and state government lawyers are protected by the attorney-client
privilege, that state law will not be applied in federal criminal or
grand jury proceedings or in federal civil actions that arise under

federal law. Any protection in those proceedings is entirely
dependent on the shape of federal privilege law. See generally Paul

F. Rothstein, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates 139-40 (2d ed. 1996).
This case concerns the federal government rather than a state
government, and the panel majority itself recognized that "a standoff
between a federal grand jury and a city governmentj] implicates

potentially serious federalism concerns." Pet. App. 9a. But the
Court of Appeals' reasoning denying privilege to the federal
government applies as well to state and local governments. Having
concluded (Pet. App. 18a) as a matter of federal common law that
"the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing
wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition
'° This Court has considered "the policy decisions of the States" in
determining the scope of privileges under federal law. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct.
at 1929. Many States recognize that the attorney-client privilege applies
to government agencies. See. e.g.. Cal. Evid. Code § 951 comment (West
1995) ("public entities have a privilege insofar as communications made in
the course of the lawyer-client relationship are concerned"). See generally
1 Gregory P. Joseph & Stephen A. Saltzberg, Evidence in America: The
Federal Rules in the States, cli. 24(1987 & Supp. 1994); Paul R. Rice,
Attorney-Client Privilege: State Law § 4.28(1996). Of the States that have

adopted Uniform Rule of Evidence 502, most have declined to adopt
subsection (d)(6) of that Rule, which restricts somewhat the government's
attorney-client privilege. id.
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of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal

proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials," it is
difficult to see how the court could reach a different result for state
and local officials.

As a result of the Court of Appeals' decision, a state lawyer
who serves as counsel to a Governor (or, for that matter, any other
state or municipal lawyer) could find herself having to testify as to
otherwise privileged communications as an adverse witness in either

a federal criminal or federal grand jury proceeding. Despite the
State's own determination that the benefits of the governmental
attorney-client privilege outweigh its costs, state and local officials

will thus be deterred from seeking legal advice, and their
communications with counsel will be constrained.

Jaffee, 116

S. Ct. at 1930 ("Denial of the federal [psychotherapist-patient]

privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state
legislation that was enacted to foster these confidential communica-

tions."). This could well result in significant damage to the
effective functioning of State governments.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this brief and in the Petition, the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
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